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Abstract
The coexistence of the government sector, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and private
sector provides a natural setting to examine the impact of economic reform in Vietnam on
gender earning differentials. The three sectors reflect different degrees of influence of the
Socialist ideology, with the private sector most liberalised. Have women fared better
during the transition into a market economy? One might expect, a priori, female workers
in the private sector may be more likely to be discriminated against especially because
employees can freely choose whom to employ. Using the Vietnam Living Standards
Survey 1992-1993, this paper has found that gender wage differences are evident in the
private sector and SOEs. Further, discrimination accounts for more of the gender wage
gap in the private sector than in the SOEs.
Key words: discrimination, gender earning differentials, decomposition, Vietnam
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* This is borrowed from the Collection of Words of Chairman Mao in China to illustrate that women are as
important as men.
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1. Introduction
One important aspect of gender issue is gender wage differentials. Wage disparity
between males and females is well documented in the literature. Economic theory
suggests that the gender wage gap may be caused by employers’ tastes which could be
shaped by traditional values (Becker 1957; Bergmann 1974; Blau & Beller 1988; Blinder
1973; Gill 1992; Johnson & Solon 1986; Moon, Moon & Zoloth 1980; Oaxaca 1973;
Sloane 1990; Sorensen 1989). However, the literature is dominated by analysis of
developed countries. The quantitative dimensions of the various causes of unequal wages
are not well known in a transitory economy.
The emerging body of literature in transitional economies where increasing
inequality in labour outcomes has become apparent. Issues concerning the deterioration
in labour market outcomes and the polarisation of benefits and costs between gender
groups within the economy are widely accepted as being key issues facing transitional
economies. Vietnam is of no exception.
Vietnam has been undergoing a gradual economic transformation from a centrally
planned to a market-oriented economy since the introduction of  “renovation”, Doi Moi,
in 1986. Have women become better or worse off? What is the role of institutional
changes? Do women still benefit from the ideology of Socialism which promotes equality
of gender? Or have the traditional Confucian values, where women are less important
than men, re-emerged? This paper involves fundamental research on these key issues. In
addition, the pursuit of these objects is not only important in the Vietnamese context but
can also contribute to the emerging body of literature in other transitional economies
where increasing inequality in labour outcomes has become apparent.
The ideal way to analyse the impact of the economic reform is to have two data
sets -- pre- and post-reform periods. Unfortunately, such comparable data sets are not
available. Instead, I propose to examine how women perform in different sectors at a
point of time to evaluate the welfare changes of women after the economy had embarked
on market reform for more than a decade. These sectors are the government sector, state-
owned enterprises, and the private sector.1 They reflect different degrees of influence of
                                                                
1 The classification of the three sectors was first used by Phan (2000) to analyse multiple job holdings and
returns to schooling in Vietnam.
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the Socialist ideology: the government sector is the least liberalised; the private sector is
the most market-oriented.
The main objective of this study is to see how the welfare of women has changed
as the economy moves towards a market-oriented one. One might expect, a priori,
discrimination accounts for more of the gender wage gap in the private sector than in the
other two sectors. 2 In addition, this paper aims to throw new light on these matters: 1)
Does wage disparity exist in Vietnam? Which sector has wage disparity?; 2) How many
of the changes in the wage gap are attributable to differences in characteristics between
men and women?; 3) How much of the male-female differential is attributable to
discrimination/cultural bias?; 4) What policy options are available to reverse the trend
towards greater inequality, if evident, arising from labour market outcomes? It is
questions such as these, which this paper seeks to answer.
2. Background
A multi-sector economy
Before the 1980s, Vietnam was a centrally planned economy. Under this system,
all the economic activities were planned and controlled by the government. Private
ownership was considered as ‘evil’. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and co-operatives
were the only two types of production units in this era.  Raw material was provided by
the government and production targets for commodities were set. The outputs produced
were sold at planned prices. The labour market was no exception. Based on the overall
plan laid down by the government, the number of workers were decided for each
organisation by respective administrative units. A salary budget was given to each
organisation and workers were paid by a pre-determined salary scale.
The inefficiency of the centrally planned system resulted in the collapse of many
SOEs, forcing the government to embark on market reform. The extensive economic
reform program in 1979 started Vietnam's struggle to resolve the economic crisis
resulting from years of central planning. In early 1981, the role of the private sector was
implicitly accepted as a legal form of ownership. Doi Moi, meaning renovation, unveiled
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in 1986, represented a significant step in the transformation towards a market-oriented
economy. One important feature during the transition has been the development of a
multi-sector economy, with the emergence of the private sector that was regarded as evil
before the reform. The three sectors, government sector, SOEs and private sector, coexist
and reflect different degrees of influence of the Socialist ideology.
Gender equality
It is well known that institutional arrangements can impact on a woman’s
economic position (Blau & Kahn 1996; Gregory 1999; Gregory & Daly 1991; Gustafsson
& Li ). Under Socialism, the State introduced regulations to protect women’s rights.
Women’s status in Vietnam has improved since 1945 with the introduction of
constitutional and legal protection and through access to education, health services and
employment (Kelly 1994). The Constitution of Vietnam accords women equal rights with
men in all respects and commits the State to raise their status and promote their role. The
basic policy of the Vietnamese Communism Party and the thrust of the reforms since the
early 1950s, besides introducing regulations to protect women’s rights, were to educate
people about equality between the sexes in marriage and the labour market and balancing
home and work responsibilities including sharing housework between spouses (Fahay
!994; UNIDO (1992). In addition, the period of war provided opportunities for women to
play prominent roles in society and in the economy, assuming important positions in local
communities, government and in the military. Women also attained a high level of
literacy and shared in the improvement in living standards.
While four decades of reform have provided a constitutional and legislative
framework that promotes equity between men and women, the underlying cultural beliefs
and traditions emanating from Confucianism may remain influential. The Confucian
tradition in the family places authority with the husband and family relations are defined
on the basis of duty which supersedes individual legal rights. For a woman this means
that her duty is as a daughter to her father, as a wife to her husband and as a mother to her
eldest son. Women’s status is lower than that of men. Sons are more valued than
                                                                                                                                                                                                
2 The term “discrimination” includes the unexplained part of the decomposition procedure that captures the
impact of discrimination and also the impact of the unobservable characteristics and omitted variables. It is
in this sense that the term discrimination is used throughout the paper.
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daughters. One Confucian saying states: ‘A sonless woman is childless and unhappy in
life.’ Another Confucian saying is that ‘If you have a son, you can say you have a
descendant. But you cannot say so even if you have ten daughters.”
Multi sectors and gender equality in transition
Given that the government sector is the least market-oriented and the private
sector is most liberalised, it is interesting to examine what the gender wage gaps are in
these three sectors. This will shed some light as to whether women have fared better
during the transition to a market economy. This remains a debatable issue in the
literature. A widening gender earning gap was reported in Russia during the market
reform (Brainerd 1998). Similarly, in their study of urban China, (Gustafsson & Li,
forthcoming) found that the unexplained part of the gender earning gap has increased
slightly over the post-reform period of 1988 to 1995.3  Liu, Meng & Zhang (forthcoming)
found increasing gender wage differentials in absolute terms from the state sector to the
private sector in Shanghai, China but they show that the relative share of discrimination
in the overall gender wage differential declines substantially from the state to the private
sector.  They argue that the decline of the relative share of discrimination is due to the
degree of marketisation in the private sector under which employers have an incentive to
value human capital characteristics related to productivity more than their own taste
towards the gender of their workers.
3. Decomposition: Gender wage gap
Oaxaca’s approach to estimating the gender wage gap is commonly used in the
literature. Two separate standard Mincerian log wage equations are estimated for males
and females. The Oaxaca decomposition is
ffmfmmfm xxxww )()(lnln bbb -+-=-
                                                                
3 China has been undertaking market reform since 1978.
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where mw  and fw are the means of males and females wages respectively; mx  and fx are
vectors containing the respective means of the independent variables for males and
females; and mb  and fb  are the estimated coefficients. The first term on the right hand
side captures the wage differential due to different characteristics of males and females.
The second term is the wage gap attributable to different returns to those characteristics
or coefficients. It is demonstrated that Oaxaca’s approach is subject to the index number
problem. The decomposition results can differ depending on which reference group or
which non-discrimination wage structure is used. The gender wage gap can be
decomposed in the following way:
mfmfmffm xxxww )()(lnln bbb -+-=-
Due to the index number problem, researchers have developed various
decompositions based on other assumed reference wage structures (Cotton 1988; Oaxaca
& Ransom 1988; Oaxaca & Ransom 1994). Neumark (1988) proposes a general
decomposition of the gender wage differential.
])()[()(lnln ffmmfmfm xxxxww bbbbb -+-+-=-
where b  is the non-discriminatory wage structure.4 He argues that under discrimination,
males are paid competitive wages but females are underpaid. If this is the case, the male
coefficients should be taken as the non-discriminatory wage structure. Conversely, if
employers pay females competitive wages but pay males more (nepotism), then the
female coefficients should be used as the non-discriminatory wage structure.
This decomposition can be reduced to Oaxaca’s two special cases if it is assumed
that there is no discrimination in the male wage structure i.e. b = bm, or if it is assumed
that b = bf instead. The choice of b  becomes critical. Some advocate using the pooled
sample to estimate b. Neumark shows that b can be estimated using the weighted average
of the wage structures of males and females. The first term is the gender wage gap
                                                                
4 Appleton, Hoddinott & Krishnan (1999) points out that the pooled coefficients may not be a good
estimator of the nondiscriminatory wage structure as there lacks evidence that the zero-homogeneity
restriction on employer preferences is valid.
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attributable to differences in characteristics. The second and the third terms capture the
difference between the actual and pooled returns for men and women respectively.
To analyse the gender wage gap in different sectors, this paper uses the Oaxaca
and Neumark’s approaches. Since not everyone is in wage employment, concern arises
over possible selection biases. Failure to control for this will lead to biased OLS
estimates. The endogeneity of employment in different sectors further complicates the
matter. These selection biases could be dealt with using the two-stage approach
advocated by Hay (1979) and Dubin & McFadden (1984). This approach is a
generalisation of Heckman's approach (1979). In the first stage, a multinominal logit
model is used to calculate the correction term, lij. This correction term is then included in
the earning equation as an additional regressor in the second stage. The predicted
probability Pij from the multinominal logit model is used to compute the correction term
lij.
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where P is the probability that the individual i is in sector j.
The presence of the additional constructed selectivity correction term renders the
standard errors not correct. White’s standard errors are used to give asymptotically
consistent values in the empirical work (White, 1978).
In interpreting the estimation of the augmented earning equation, the significance
of the correction term, lij, indicates that the selectivity has led to biased estimates in the
OLS. A positive sign of  lij indicates a positive correlation between the unobservable
characteristics of an individual which influences his or her choice to work in a particular
sector and his or her earnings. A negative sign suggests a negative correlation between
the two.
4. Empirical results
Data
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The available data are from the Living Standards Survey 1992-1993 conducted by
the World Bank and the State Planning Committee of Vietnam. The survey was the first
of this kind of large-scale survey ever carried out in Vietnam. It collected data on the
household and individual levels in health, education, agricultural, fertility, expenditure,
migration and saving. The Living Standards Survey allows comprehensive exploration of
many aspects of the economy during the early phase of the transition.
The sample that is used in this paper is defined as follows: Wage earners who 1)
worked in the 12 months prior to the survey; 2) were aged between 18 and 60 years,
inclusive; and 3) supplied earnings data. There are 2036 wage earners in the sample
(1173 are males and 863 are females).
Labour participation and wages in different sectors: Males and females
Figure 1 presents the gender differences in labour participation by gender and age.
It is striking to find that the participation pattern of women is similar to that of men. And
the female labour participation rate is only slightly lower than the male. In addition, the
participation rate of women shows little sign of declining during the child-bearing age.
The participation rate of males and females starts to drop at around 40 years old. This
may be due to the increase in redundancy in the state sector. A similar pattern was also
found in China (Meng, 1998).
[Figure 1] Labour participation rate, by gender and age
This paper focuses on three sectors: the government sector, SOEs and the private
sector. The government sector includes government organisations, including the military;
and social organisations, such as the Women’s Association. Twenty-six percent of the
wage earners work in the government sector. There are 48.6 percent males (Figures 2 and
3).
The SOEs include state-owned enterprises and cooperatives. They are grouped
together because there are many common characteristics between the two. Also, there are
few observations for cooperatives to form a separate group of their own. This sector
absorbs 21 percent of the wage employees. About 54 percent of the workers in this sector
are males.
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The private sector includes mixed state-private enterprises, joint venture
companies, 100 percent foreign investment companies, private companies and small
household firms. Despite the fact that the playing field is not yet level, with policies
favouring government and SOEs, the private sector has been developing at a fast pace.
Fifty-three percent of the wage workers are employed in this sector. Over 60 percent of
the workers in this sector are males, whereas the split between males and females are
relatively even in the other two sectors (Figure 3).
Not until the Labour code was passed in 1995, private sector had been subject to
few regulations on working conditions and fringe benefits. However, employees in the
government sector and SOEs are entitled to fringe benefits such as maternity leave and
childcare leave. In addition, the lack of monitoring system means less working time and
effort required in the public sector, allowing more flexibility for females to combine
work with domestic responsibilities. These characteristics of the public sector attract
more female employees relative to the private sector.
[Figure 2] Distribution of wage workers, by sector
[Figure 3] Distribution of wage workers, by gender and sector
[Table 1] Hourly earnings of wage workers, by gender, education and sector
Over 75 percent of the employees in the government sector are professional,
technical and related workers. Only 20 percent of the SOEs employees belong to the
same category. The private sector absorbs a relatively high proportion of unskilled
labour.  About 55 percent of the private sector employees work as production and related
workers, transport equipment operators and labourers. Only about 25 percent of the SOEs
employees fall into the same occupational categories. As shown in Table 1, employees of
SOEs, on average, receive higher hourly wages than employees in the other two sectors.
The mean of the hourly wages of a male SOE employee is 21 percent higher than that of
a male government sector worker and 1.8 percent more than that of a male employee in
the private sector. Females are paid less than males in all three sectors. The gender wage
gap is the largest in the private sector (males are paid 48 percent higher than females) and
the smallest in the government sector.
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In terms of the return to education, employees in the government sector are, on
average, the most educated, with 13.13 years of schooling compared with 10.35 and 6.71
years for workers in the SOEs and private firms. All three sectors reward higher
education in general. However, the variations in the hourly wage rate in the government
sector tend to be the smallest across different education levels.
Earning equations
I estimated conventional Mincerian log earning functions for males and females
and also separately for the government sector, SOEs, and private sector. A summary of
Table 2 reports the means of the main explanatory variables.  Labour market experience
is commonly proxied by potential experience defined by Mincer (1974) despite the fact
that interrupted experience is not accounted for. The survey allows the construction of
job-specific tenure and potential experience in previous job(s). Therefore, two
specifications of the earning equation are used: one with potential experience as a
regressor; the other with job-specific tenure and potential experience in previous job(s) as
independent variables. I will refer to them as Models 1 and 2 hereafter. Other
independent variables, which are common to Models 1 and 2, include dummies on
marital status, migrant status, urban, region (north-south) and ethnic groups (majority-
minority). According to the literature, occupational segregation could add to the gender
wage gap. Unfortunately, some of the occupation cells have few observations; therefore,
occupational dummies are excluded in the earning equations.5
The estimation of the pooled sample is presented in Table 3. Gender and sectoral
dummies are found to be significant. Other things being constant, females earn less than
their male counterparts. The employees of the government sector and SOEs are rewarded
less than those of the private sector.
The earning equations for different sectors and different gender groups are then
estimated. For each sector, two variants of each specification are reported: one with the
Hay two-stage approach to correct for selectivity, one without. In the empirical
                                                                
5 As mentioned in the background section, the period of war provided opportunities for women to assume
various positions in the society. It was common to have women working in jobs that were traditionally
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application, a multinominal logit model with five categories is specified. They include the
government sector, SOEs, private sector, self-employed, and people who are not working.
Identification is achieved by including variables, such as number of children, non- labour
income, the dependency ratio, and the dummies which captured which sector the
household head is working for. These variables affect participation in a particular sector
but not wages. In the second stage, I use the correction term lij computed from the
multinominal logit model to augment the earning functions. The inclusion of the
correction term ensures that the OLS gives consistent estimates of the augmented earning
functions for the three sectors.
Tables 4-6 report the results of Model 1 for the three sectors. Also reported in
Tables 7-9 are the results of the specification of Model 2 for different sectors. All three
sectors reward education. For instance, as shown in Tables 4-6, returns to schooling is 6.2
percent for an additional year of education in the government sector, and 4.3 percent and
3.9 percent for SOEs and the private sector respectively. Potential experience is only
found to be significant for the private sector. Similarly, both job-specific tenure and
potential other experience from previous job(s) are only significant for the private sector.
The correction terms in general are not significant. Notably, significant gender
differences are only evident in the earning equation for workers in the SOEs and private
sector, but not for government employees. This result suggests that gender inequality is
most narrow in the sector in which the egalitarian ideology of socialism is put into
practice most.
Earning equations for males and females are then estimated separately for SOEs
and the private sector. Results for Models 1 and 2 are reported in Tables 10-13. Not many
gender differences are found in the returns to schooling. For example, as shown in Tables
10 and 11, the returns to schooling are 4 percent for males and 4.5 percent for females in
SOEs and 3.8 percent and 3.8 percent for male employees and female employees in the
private sector. Note that the correction term is only significant for male employees in the
private sector at the 10 percent level. As such, decomposition results are based on the
earning equations for SOEs and the private sector without correcting for selectivity.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
considered as men’s jobs. The problem of occupational segregation may not be as serious as in other
countries.
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The split between the explained component (differences due to characteristics)
and the unexplained part (differences due to returns or discrimination) will throw more
light on the question: Does discrimination account for more of the gender earning
differential in the private sector, which practices the least Socialist ideology, than in the
SOEs?
Decomposition
The decomposition results are presented in Tables 14-15.
The Oaxaca method, as discussed above, is subject to the index number problem.
Using the male or female wage structure, the Oaxaca method generates different
decomposition results. For Model 1, Table 14 reports 73 percent and 88 percent of the
gender wage gap in SOEs are attributable to the unexplained component, using male and
female wage structure respectively. Nonetheless, the qualitative result is consistent
regardless of which wage structure is used. That is, discrimination is found to account for
most of the gender earning differentials. This result holds for Model 2 as well.  For the
private sector, almost all gender wage disparities are explained by discrimination. This
holds true for Models 1 and 2.
The Neumark decomposition solves the index number problem by using the
weighted wage structure. In general, the qualitative result does not show substantial
variations across Model 1 and Model 2. For instance, Table 14 reports that for employees
of the SOEs, about 48 percent and 57 percent of the earning differentials between males
and females are explained by the deviation of the returns to females from the pooled
wage structure, i.e. discrimination against females. In spite of the quantitative differences,
both results indicate that female disadvantage is mostly responsible for the gender wage
gap, regardless of which model specification is used. Further both models indicate that
around 33 percent of the wage gap is explained by the deviation of the returns to males
from the pooled wage structure, i.e. nepotism. Note as well that similar results could be
drawn from Models 1 and 2 for private sector workers. That is, female disadvantage and
nepotism account for most of the gender wage disparity.
The relative shares of discrimination in the gender wage gap derived from the
Neumark decomposition are smaller compared with those in the Oaxaca decomposition.
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Nonetheless both decomposition methods highlight that female disadvantage contributes
to most of the gender wage gap in the two sectors.
Most importantly, discrimination accounts for more of the gender wage gap in the
private sector than SOEs. Note that Model 2 shows that discrimination accounts for over
62 percent of the gender wage differentials in the private sector. Only about 56 percent of
the earning differentials is attributable to the gender earning differentials for SOEs.
Similar pattern is found in the decomposition results for Model 1. This may be due to the
nature of the institution.
In the private sector, employers can freely choose whom to employ. The degree of
marketisation in the private sector influences the extent to which employers reward skills
and productivity of employees regardless of their gender.  Private sector is still in early
stage of development in Vietnam particularly in terms of the degree of marketisation.
Marketisation may yet to be a strong enough force to reduce gender wage gap if the
employers not only care about the productivity of a particular employee but also derive
disutility from employing female workers. As a result, female employees will be
discriminated against. The taste of the employers could be shaped by the Confucian
values under which females are valued less than males. The practice of the egalitarian
ideology of Socialism over the past twenty years does not seem to have altered the
preferences of individual. Traditional values re-emerge when the institutional
arrangement allows employers to favour them.
5. Conclusion
How have women fared during the transition from a centrally planned economy to
a market oriented one? A multi-sector economy has developed since Vietnam undertook
the comprehensive market reform, Doi Moi, in 1986. Given that the government sector is
least liberialised and the private sector is the most market oriented, the co-existence of
sectors provides a natural setting to explore the relationship between the eqalitarian
ideology of Socialism and the gender earning differentials.
Estimating a standard Mincerian earning equation on a pooled sample, the results
suggested that significant gender and sectoral differences exist. Separate earning
equations for the three sectors were estimated and adjusted for selectivity. No gender
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differences were found in the government sector. The correction terms for selectivity
were in general not significant. The decomposition procedures developed by Oaxaca and
Neumark were applied to SOEs and the private sector.
This paper, based on the Vietnam Living Standards Survey 1992-1993, has found
the following: 1) No gender wage differentials is evident in the government sector; 2)
discrimination accounts for most of the gender earning differentials in the SOEs and
private sector; 3) most importantly, the share of the gender earning gap attributable to
discrimination is relatively higher in the private sector than SOEs. To conclude, women
may have been discriminated against during the early phase of transition to a market
oriented economy. This is mainly because employers are free to choose whom to employ
and their preferences may work against females. This suggests that more than two
decades of central planning did not change the social attitude towards women. When such
institutional arrangements have been gradually removed, the traditional Confucian values
re-emerge. In addition, with the private sector still at the early stage of development, the
degree of marketisation has yet to provide strong enough incentive for employers to
reward productivity-related characteristics of employees. Conscious and persistent effort
in promoting gender equality as well as marketising the economy further to promote
competition are important as it may take much longer for the social attitude to change
than one would expect.
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Data Appendix
Dependent variable: hourly earning rate of the main job over a 12 months period in
logarithm. It includes cash and in-kind payment.
Independent variables:
Potential experience: Age minus years of schooling minus six (the official school
entrance age)
Potential experience2 : The square term of potential experience divided by 100
Job-specific tenure: The duration that one has been working in the main job during the
past 12mth.
Job-specific tenure2 : The square term of job-specific tenure divided by 100
Potential experience in previous job(s): the working experiences in all the previous
job(s). It is proxied by minus years of schooling and job specific tenure from an
individual employee’s age.
Migrant: If a person was not born in the district that he or she was living in at the time of
the interview, the migrant dummy coded as one, zero otherwise.
Married: A person who is married, divorced, widow or widower is coded as one, zero
otherwise.
North: The North is coded as one. It includes the northern mountainous regions, Red
River Delta and the north central region. The South refers to the central coast region,
central highlands, southeast, and the Mekong Delta.
Urban: Urban area is coded as one and rural areas is coded as zero.
Majority: In Vietnam, Kinh is the major ethnic group and makes up 87 percent of the
population. Minorities include Chinese, Thai, Khome, Mung, Dao, Tay, Huong, H’mong.
A person belonging to the Kinh ethnic group is coded one, zero otherwise.
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Figure 1 Labour participation rate, by gender and age
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Figure 3 Distribution of wage workers, by gender and sector
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Table 1 Hourly earnings of wage workers, by gender, education and sector
Hourly earnings (‘000 dongs)
Males Females
Government sector 0.999 0.899
     Below primary 1.105 0.753
     Primary 0.665 1.109
     Lower secondary 0.649 0.746
     Upper secondary 1.498 1.255
     Vocational/technical 0.903 0.730
     Undergraduate or above 1.175 1.117
SOEs sector 1.208 0.829
     Below primary 1.122 0.871
     Primary 1.519 1.046
     Lower secondary 1.326 0.768
     Upper secondary 1.205 0.734
     Vocational/technical 1.188 0.688
     Undergraduate or above 1.872 1.580
Private sector 1.186 0.800
     Below primary 1.021 0.743
     Primary 1.359 0.805
     Lower secondary 1.157 0.962
     Upper secondary 1.232 0.933
     Vocational/technical 1.172 0.957
     Undergraduate or above 1.488
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Table 2 Summary of statistics of main variables
Government sector State-owned enterprises Private sector
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
ln hourly wage rate (‘000 dongs) -0.34 0.86 -0.33 0.67 -0.05 0.92 -0.47 0.82 -0.10 0.88 -0.49 0.92
Potential experience 17.77 10.53 15.32 9.32 18.28 9.50 15.21 9.30 16.85 10.49 16.68 11.32
Potential experience2 4.26 4.67 3.21 3.42 4.24 4.18 3.17 3.73 3.94 4.85 4.06 5.11
Married 0.87 0.34 0.77 0.42 0.82 0.39 0.67 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.49
Migrant 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.55 0.50 0.78 0.42 0.71 0.46
Years of schooling 13.06 4.75 13.30 3.65 10.78 4.15 10.32 3.76 7.16 3.35 6.80 3.38
Urban 0.50 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.48 0.50
North 0.43 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40
Majority 0.95 0.23 0.95 0.22 0.94 0.24 0.97 0.16 0.88 0.33 0.88 0.32
Job-specific tenure 10.47 8.10 11.89 8.25 8.85 7.24 9.20 7.01 6.40 6.62 6.04 6.92
Job-specific tenure2 1.75 2.37 2.09 2.51 1.31 2.04 1.34 1.79 0.85 1.85 0.84 2.00
Potential previous experience 7.29 9.64 3.42 7.00 9.42 8.53 6.01 7.60 10.45 8.63 10.65 9.78
Potential previous experience2 1.46 3.13 0.61 1.63 1.61 2.68 0.94 2.09 1.83 3.05 2.09 3.63
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Table 3 Results of earning equation
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.036 5.165
Potential experience2 -0.061 -3.823
Job- specific exp 0.029 3.638
Job- specific exp2 -0.057 -2.223
Potential other exp 0.022 4.001
Potential other exp2 -0.045 -2.819
Gender 0.243 6.266 0.241 6.191
Married 0.005 0.096 0.033 0.646
Migrant -0.072 -1.758 -0.071 -1.730
Years of schooling 0.049 8.541 0.051 8.367
Urban 0.116 2.958 0.125 3.189
North -0.438 -10.814 -0.438 -10.743
Majority -0.219 -3.301 -0.235 -3.542
Government -0.273 -4.555 -0.285 -4.611
SOEs -0.053 -1.991 -0.065 -1.684
Constant -0.820 -7.353 -0.749 -6.759
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
1891
0.1387
29.60
1891
0.1369
25.11
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Table 4 Results of earning equation for government employees
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.017 1.535 -0.009 -0.546
Potential experience2 -0.006 -0.231 0.055 1.188
Gender -0.047 -0.740 -0.050 -0.059
Married -0.156 -1.513 0.146 0.903
Migrant -0.133 -2.121 -0.206 -2.559
Years of schooling 0.062 6.294 0.053 4.505
Urban 0.023 0.355 0.108 1.266
North -0.284 -4.525 -0.338 -4.488
Majority -0.278 -2.062 -0.499 -2.349
Lamda 0.054 0.641
Constant -0.808 -3.487 -0.464 -1.402
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
529
0.1387
9.26
325
0.1837
6.84
Table 5 Results of earning equation for SOEs employees
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.013 0.855 0.015 0.869
Potential experience2 0.002 0.067 0.016 0.419
Gender 0.337 4.621 0.223 2.368
Married -0.006 -0.065 -0.022 -0.170
Migrant -0.003 -0.038 0.046 0.490
Years of schooling 0.043 4.261 0.038 3.000
Urban 0.288 3.810 0.316 3.241
North -0.708 -8.818 -0.706 -7.085
Majority -0.136 -0.768 -0.299 -1.206
Lamda 0.057 0.719
Constant -0.761 -3.200 -0.613 -1.658
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
433
0.2827
22.02
292
0.2572
12.86
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Table 6 Results of earning equation for private sector employees
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.049 4.199 0.061 3.502
Potential experience2 -0.096 -3.997 -0.104 -3.206
Gender 0.381 6.230 0.348 3.987
Married 0.105 1.361 -0.015 -0.116
Migrant -0.068 -0.985 -0.115 -1.390
Years of schooling 0.039 4.062 0.041 3.142
Urban 0.115 1.825 0.045 0.535
North -0.369 -5.052 -0.324 -3.415
Majority -0.194 -2.206 -0.129 -1.090
Lamda -0.094 -1.234
Constant -1.003 -5.949 -1.146 -4.723
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
929
0.1306
15.96
571
0.1144
8.48
Table 7 Results of earning equation for government employees (tenure)
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Job-specific exp 0.014 1.206 -0.006 -0.368
Jon-specific exp2 0.008 0.227 0.061 1.168
Potential other exp 0.027 3.025 0.011 0.881
Potential other exp2 -0.048 -1.743 -0.032 0.062
Gender -0.053 -0.809 -0.014 -0.155
Married -0.155 -1.540 0.117 0.747
Migrant -0.136 -2.161 -0.208 -2.575
Years of schooling 0.065 5.733 0.054 4.225
Urban 0.018 0.288 0.106 1.237
North -0.294 -4.621 -0.357 -4.592
Majority -0.274 -2.023 -0.493 -2.396
Lamda 0.054 0.648
Constant -0.828 -3.430 -0.521 -1.585
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
529
0.1445
7.80
325
0.1804
5.63
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Table 8 Results of earning equation for SOEs employees (tenure)
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Job-specific exp 0.006 0.376 0.044 2.181
Jon-specific exp2 0.062 1.221 -0.052 -0.828
Potential other exp 0.001 0.083 0.008 0.498
Potential other exp2 0.011 0.251 0.030 0.560
Gender 0.371 4.834 0.271 2.740
Married 0.009 0.088 -0.075 -0.591
Migrant 0.006 0.008 0.044 0.471
Years of schooling 0.033 3.103 0.031 2.284
Urban 0.259 3.441 0.277 2.833
North -0.729 -9.051 -0.704 -6.778
Majority -0.124 -0.697 -0.361 -1.478
Lamda 0.061 0.765
Constant -0.607 -2.584 -0.554 -1.555
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
433
0.2962
19.76
292
0.2672
10.97
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Table 9 Results of earning equation for private sector employees (tenure)
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Job-specific exp 0.037 2.901 0.041 2.409
Jon-specific exp2 -0.135 -3.140 -0.121 -2.171
Potential other exp 0.030 3.132 0.044 3.520
Potential other exp2 -0.068 -2.958 -0.087 -2.994
Gender 0.378 6.208 0.332 3.882
Married 0.160 2.113 0.061 0.548
Migrant -0.061 -0.880 -0.108 -1.283
Years of schooling 0.040 4.063 0.044 3.287
Urban 0.129 2.045 0.050 0.587
North -0.387 -5.271 -0.338 -3.596
Majority -0.201 -2.252 -0.139 -1.158
Lamda -0.086 -1.146
Constant -0.908 -5.434 -1.031 -4.710
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
929
0.1307
12.94
571
0.1157
6.43
 Table 10 Results of earning equation for state-owned enterprise employees
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Males Females Males Females
Independent variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Potential experience 0.012 0.531 0.007 0.384 -0.033 0.135 0.014 0.581
Potential experience2 -0.009 -0.173 0.033 0.751 0.019 0.357 0.038 0.725
Married -0.038 -0.215 0.057 0.487 0.083 0.324 -0.035 -0.230
Migrant -0.100 -0.932 0.094 0.869 -0.036 -0.286 0.140 1.010
Years of schooling 0.040 2.802 0.045 3.034 0.028 1.594 0.047 2.365
Urban 0.288 2.575 0.277 2.795 0.373 2.829 0.210 1.526
North -0.624 -5.186 -0.823 -8.106 -0.587 -4.099 -0.838 -6.045
Majority -0.175 -0.763 0.081 0.315 -0.349 -1.093 -0.155 -0.376
Lamda 0.006 0.061 0.135 1.178
Constant -0.252 -0.738 -1.029 -3.189 -0.187 -0.384 -0.756 -1.393
No. of observations 238 195 164 128
Adjusted R2 0.2162 0.3060 0.1998 0.3310
F-statistics 9.62 (8,229) 13.52 (8, 186) 6.36 (9, 154) 8.38 (9, 118)
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Table 11 Results of earning equation for private sector employees
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Males Females Males Females
Independent variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Potential experience 0.051 3.505 0.049 2.518 0.069 3.673 0.053 1.441
Potential experience2 -0.091 -3.003 -0.112 -2.874 -0.114 -3.155 -0.108 -1.613
Married 0.100 1.036 0.066 0.530 0.268 0.190 -0.074 -0.303
Migrant -0.035 -0.403 -0.145 -1.241 -0.152 -1.559 -0.074 -0.484
Years of schooling 0.038 3.362 0.039 2.054 0.030 2.106 0.057 1.923
Urban 0.085 1.099 0.177 1.588 -0.011 -0.109 -0.168 0.968
North -0.352 -4.313 -0.408 -2.785 -0.320 -3.347 -2.757 -1.003
Majority -0.198 -1.790 -0.182 -1.251 -0.127 -0.849 -0.141 -0.755
Lamda -0.156 -1.785 -0.019 -0.139
Constant -0.681 -3.176 -0.894 -3.086 -0.831 -3.094 -1.104 -2.611
No. of observations 604 325 394 177
Adjusted R2 0.0974 0.1024 0.1159 0.0806
F-statistics 8.84 (8,595) 4.55 (8, 316) 5.99 (9, 384) 2.99 (9, 167)
Table 12 Results of earning equation for SOEs employees (tenure)
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Males Females Males Females
Independent variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Job specific tenure -0.001 -0.050 0.012 0.550 0.041 1.442 0.031 1.120
Job specific tenure2 0.091 1.254 0.024 0.351 -0.056 -0.609 -0.009 -0.116
Potential other exp -0.020 -1.046 0.017 0.862 -0.014 -0.577 0.016 0.060
Potential other exp2 0.036 0.596 0.017 0.201 0.054 0.805 0.114 1.171
Married 0.017 0.101 0.039 0.343 0.011 0.047 -0.056 -0.378
Migrant -0.046 -0.435 0.093 0.887 -0.059 -0.047 1.123 0.902
Years of schooling 0.018 1.182 0.046 3.066 0.018 0.911 0.041 2.059
Urban 0.212 1.956 0.278 2.764 0.303 2.317 0.199 1.379
North -0.662 -5.737 -0.816 -7.531 -0.576 -3.978 -0.855 -5.333
Majority -0.155 -0.687 0.097 0.382 -0.453 -1.479 -0.193 -0.458
Lamda 0.017 0.175 0.126 1.114
Constant 0.155 0.473 -1.099 -3.435 0.006 0.012 -0.686 -1.286
No. of observations 238 195 164 128
Adjusted R2 0.2590 0.3051 0.2253 0.3377
F-statistics 10.95 (10,227) 11.53 (10, 184) 5.81 (11, 152) 6.98 (11,116)
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Table 13 Results of earning equation for private sector employees (tenure)
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Males Females Males Females
Independent variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Job specific tenure 0.027 1.739 0.047 2.271 0.035 1.826 0.050 1.682
Job specific tenure2 -0.075 -1.473 -0.213 -3.277 -0.093 -1.463 -0.189 -2.390
Potential other exp 0.022 1.769 0.041 2.714 0.027 1.750 0.075 3.370
Potential other exp2 -0.044 -1.429 -0.102 -2.923 -0.040 -1.136 -0.171 -3.506
Married 0.200 2.045 0.085 0.712 0.204 1.473 -0.141 -0.716
Migrant -0.035 -0.401 -0.105 -0.924 -0.141 -1.412 -0.063 -0.409
Years of schooling 0.037 3.118 0.038 2.041 0.031 2.062 0.058 2.049
Urban 0.102 1.301 0.181 1.632 -0.024 -0.024 0.130 0.781
North -0.373 -4.557 -0.424 -2.894 -0.356 -3.605 -0.202 -0.788
Majority -0.221 -1.977 -0.156 -1.061 -0.165 -1.082 -0.124 -0.658
Lamda -0.145 -1.676 -0.022 -0.160
Constant -0.473 -2.215 -0.915 -3.357 -0.542 -1.938 -1.217 -3.735
No. of observations 604 325 394 177
Adjusted R2 0.0863 0.1333 0.1234 0.1360
F-statistics 5.95 (10, 593) 5.20 (10, 314) 3.95 (11, 382) 3.92 (11, 165)
Table 14 Decomposition of gender wage gap in state-owned enterprises
With potential
experience
With job-specific
tenure and potential
other experience
Gap Percent Gap Percent
mWln                                                     -0.05
fWln                                                     -0.47 0.42
Oaxaca
   Male wage structure
       Characteristics 0.112 26.79 0.118 28.28
       Returns 0.306 73.21 0.300 71.72
   Female wage structure
       Characteristics 0.048 11.48 -0.017 -4.18
       Returns 0.370 88.52 0.436 104.18
 Neumark
   Weighted wage structure
       Skill difference 0.077 18.48 0.044 10.56
       Male advantage 0.139 33.25 0.136 32.57
       Female disadvantage 0.202 48.27 0.238 56.867
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Table 15 Decomposition of gender wage gap in private enterprises
With potential
experience
With job-specific
tenure and potential
other experience
Gap Percent Gap Percent
mWln                                                     -0.10
fWln                                                     -0.49 0.39
Oaxaca
   Male wage structure
       Characteristics -0.005 -1.27 0.008 2.17
       Returns 0.392 101.28 0.378 97.82
   Female wage structure
       Characteristics 0.010         2.57 0.004 1.03
       Returns 0.377 97.43 0.382 98.97
 Neumark
   Weighted wage structure
       Skill difference 0.003 0.82 0.006 1.44
       Male advantage 0.178 45.97 0.138 35.79
       Female disadvantage 0.206  53.11 0.242 62.76
